Are Health Care Costs/Payments Influenced by Computerized Optimization by Jennings, Carol A.
ARE HEALTH CARE COSTS/PAYMENTS INFLUENCED 
BY COMPUTERIZED OPTIMIZATION
CAROL A. JENNINGS
Presented to the Public Administration Faculty 
at The University of Michigan-Flint 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
Master of Public Administration Degree
April, 1994
First Reader
Second Reader  Clxk
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION...............................
LITERATURE REVIEW.  .......... ............
Discretion...........................


























STUDIES OF OPTIMIZATION AND DRG MANIPULATION.................... 11
CMI/NUMBER OF RECORDS BY FISCAL YEAR AND BY GROUPER............ 16
MEDICARE CMI FOR FY 89 AND FY 91.................................. 17
CMI/DISCHARGE MONTH BY FISCAL YEAR BY GROUPER VERSION..........19
COMPUTED CMI/DISCHARGE MONTH BY FISCAL YEAR BY GROUPER 
VERSION...............................................................20
ANALYSIS OF YEARLY CMI PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCES................... 21
IMPACT OF QUARTER ON CMI........................................... 21
TWO-SAMPLE T-TEST FOR DIFFERENCE IN FISCAL YEAR WEIGHTS
BASED ON DRG ASSIGNMENT............................................ 22
TWO-SAMPLE T-TEST FOR DIFFERENCE IN FISCAL YEAR WEIGHTS 
EXCLUDING UNGROUPABLE PATIENTS.................................... 23
TWO-SAMPLE T-TEST FOR CHANGE IN DRG BASE PAYMENT/TDRG..........24
ii
INTRODUCTION
In 1983, Congress passed the Social Security Amendments 
(Public Law 98-21) which mandated an end to cost- 
reimbursement for Medicare inpatients. This law established 
the prospective payment system(PPS) for hospital Medicare 
inpatient reimbursement. PPS is a fixed per-case payment
system for patients in 468, now 494, diagnosis-related 
groups(DRGs) (Office of Technology, 1986).
"DRGs are a patient classification system 
developed to reflect differences in 
predicted resource use among different kinds 
of hospital patients" (Office of Technology, 1986).
There are three basic incentives for hospital managers 
and physicians under a per-case pricing system. The 
incentives are:
-to reduce cost per admission;
-to increase the number of profitable admissions;
-offer new services not covered by payment 
restrictions.
The profitability of any admission depends on the price 
paid. The price paid depends on the DRG to which the 
admission is classified (Office of Technology, 1986).
"Hospitals also have an incentive to assign patients to 
DRGs that will provide the greatest possible revenue"
(Office of Technology, 1986). A computer program, called a 
GROUPER, uses diagnostic, procedure codes, and patient age
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to make DRG assignments. Under the medicare reimbursement 
system prior to PPS, accurate diagnostic and procedural 
coding was not crucial to the payment process and many 
errors appear to have occurred. Hospitals now have an 
incentive to code accurately and to "report codes that will 
maximize payment levels" (Office of Technology, 1986).
The implementation of any policy leads to 
adaptation as the policy evolves in response to its 
environment. Unforeseen consequences are to be 
expected. During adaptation, decision-making is 
dispersed (Pressman, 1984). What this means is that each 
agency or provider involved in the implementation of the 
policy adapts to make the policy work to their particular 
advantage. Since Medicare reimbursement is determined by 
the DRG assignment, the way in which providers responded to 
the policy may have influenced the final DRG payment.
"Since administrative discretion can 
be used as a cover for arbitrary 
behavior that is unrelated to policy 
intentions, some authors feel that 
the problem of administration is, 
purely and simply, one of controlling 
discretion" (Pressman, 1984).
If Pressman is correct about discretion, the intent of the
Medicare Prospective Payment System to control Medicare
expenditures for hospital care can only be realised if a





The topic of discretion needs to be explored since the 
amount of discretion applied, at all levels of policy 
implementation, could lead to a totally different outcome 
than was intended by policy makers.
Webster defines the word discretion as follows:
"power of decision: individual judgement; 
power of free decision or choice within 
which a court or judge decides questions 
arising in a particular case not expressly 
controlled by fixed rules of law according 
to the circumstances and according to the 
judgement of the court or judge; ability 
to make decisions which represent a 
responsible choice and for which an 
understanding of what is lawful, right, or 
wise may be presupposed"(Webster. 1986).
Discretion in decision making is not limited to 
health care. A good example is the criminal justice 
system and the impact of discretionary decisions on prison 
overcrowding. Attempts to control discretionary decision 
making in California only resulted in a shifting of the 
discretion from one decision maker to another (McCoy, 1984).
California’s Determinate Sentencing Law (D.S.L.), 1977, 
was enacted to shift discretion from parole decision makers 
to the sentencing judges. By controlling discretionary 
power, legislators and voters wanted to increase the 
severity of punishment for felons and prevent the parole 
board from releasing prisoners too soon (McCoy, 1984). The 
result was that discretion shifted to the district
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attorneys. Plea bargaining became the determinator of the 
sentence. As a result, California passed Proposition 8 
which banned plea bargaining in 1982. Proposition 8, 
however, contains a loop-hole and the district attorneys 
still have discretionary plea bargaining ability in the 
Municipal Courts. According to McCoy, since the elimination 
of the parole board discretionary decisions, prison 
populations have increased in California.
The major purpose of the Prospective Payment Plan is to 
hold down the rise in Medicare expenditures (Posgar, 1987). 
However, the system allows for considerable discretion, on 
the part of both the payers and the providers, in 
determining the DRG, and therefore, the payment for the 
patients’ medical care. For example, if a patient is 
admitted with multiple problems, Medicare and the hospital 
may determine two completely different principal diagnoses 
based on individual review of the medical record and 
interpretation of the coding rules and the medical record.
Discretion in Medicare Billing
"Upon discharge from the hospital, the 
attending physician must document the 
principal diagnosis (i.e., 'the 
condition established after study to be 
chiefly responsible for occasioning the 
admission of the patient to the hospital 
for care’; HCFA). In addition, specific 
reference must be made to significant 
comorbidities (i.e. secondary diagnoses), 
complications and significant operative 
and non-operative diagnostic and therapeutic 
procedures performed"(Blue Cross, 1990).
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This policy for documentation is the basis for the 
information about the patient’s health care that determines 
the DRG to which the patient is classified. How this policy 
is interpreted by HCFA, the fiscal intermediary (in 
Michigan, Blue Cross or Travelers), the physicians and the 
hospitals can have an impact on the price paid for a 
specific patient’s care.
Operationally, Medicare reimbursement depends upon 
proper application of coding rules (Hsia, 1992). Often, 
the hospital, Medicare reviewers and the physicians do not 
agree on the reason the patient was admitted to the hospital 
and therefore, they do not agree on the principal diagnosis. 
This disagreement results in a conflict over the payment.
Hospital Discretion
Even before implementation of the PPS/DRG system by 
Medicare, studies showed that there was a way to optimize a 
DRG payment by resequencing diagnoses and the ICD-9-CM 
codes. In one study, a computer program was written to 
reverse the principal and second diagnoses and recalculate 
the DRG. "In twenty-three percent of the cases, the 
reversed sequence of the first two listed diagnoses would 
have been the costlier sequence" (Sounding Board, 1981).
The author of this article "imagined" a sophisticated 
computer system with tables developed for diagnostic 
combinations to allow switching of the sequence of the
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first and second diagnoses in situations in which either 
could be appropriately considered the principal 
diagnosis" (Sounding Board, 1981).
He further hypothesized that another computer program 
could be developed to audit abstracts and identify cases for 
further review for potential increase in payment by 
resequencing of codes (Sounding Board, 1981). Both of these 
systems are a reality and in use by hospitals today and are 
at the heart of hospital "discretion" and Medicare billing.
An additional method to increase reimbursement is by 
physician education in the appropriate documentation of 
diagnoses and procedures. "Minor diagnostic nuances and 
slight imprecisions of wording have little practical 
clinical importance, yet under DRG reimbursement they would 
have major financial consequences" (Sounding Board, 1981). 
There are health care consulting companies that work with 
hospitals to educate physicians in documentation methods for 
DRG as s i gnment.
With the implementation of DRGs, cooperation of the 
physicians, in timely and accurate documentation, has become 
one of the most important links to reimbursement. The 
hospitals literally have taught physicians to document the 
"best" principal diagnosis and all other diagnoses the 
patient is treated for, as well as any complications and all 




Concern has been raised about the ability of the DRG 
system to control health care costs. However, the DRG 
system doesn’t take into consideration the importance of 
physician practice styles in determining hospital case 
mix (Wennberg, 1985). It now appears that physician 
discretion plays an important role in DRG assignment.
Studies have shown that "differences in illness rates 
cannot provide an adequate explanation for the differences 
in hospitalisation rates seen" (Wennberg, 1985). Variations 
in observed rates, he suggests, must be due to incidences of 
conditions in hospital markets or "peculiarities" in coding 
practices. Much of the observed variation in rates appears 
to result from the physicians’ options to admit or from 
their differing use of the ICD-9-CM system (Wennberg, 1985).
Diagnostic Related Groups 
The diagnostic-related groups used in Medicare's PPS 
are based on a coding and classification system known as the 
International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, 
Clinical Modification(ICD-9-CM) (Office of Technology,
1986). ICD-9-CM has two parts, one is a list of diagnoses 
codes and the other is a list of procedure codes. Both the 
disease and procedure codes are organized according to organ 
system with additional sections for subjects such as 
infectious diseases and accidental injuries. Diseases are
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assigned three to five digits to allow for specificity. The 
procedure codes have a maximum of four digits (Office of 
Technology, 1986).
"ICD-9-CM was not developed to serve as the basis for 
provider reimbursement" (Fox, 1992). The purpose of ICD-9- 
CM was to classify morbidity data to be used to evaluate 
care, plan health care delivery systems, analyze payments 
for services and for conducting epidemiological and clinical 
research (Fox, 1992). Therefore, the coding system was 
wide-open for discretionary interpretation by Medicare, 
physicians and hospitals in its use for assigning DRGs.
DRG assignment depends on both diagnosis and procedure 
codes. The presence or absence of a procedure code 
determines whether the DRG is medical or surgical. The 
principal diagnosis code places the patient in the 
appropriate major diagnostic category (Office of Technology, 
1986). The principal diagnosis is the diagnosis, which 
after study, is most closely related to the reason for 
admission. The secondary diagnosis indicates the presence 
of a complication or cormorbid condition.
Generally, surgical DRGs have a higher reimbursement 
rate than the medical DRGs. Inaccurate or inadequate coding 
could lead to incorrect DRG assignment and, therefore, 
inaccurate reimbursement. Also, some medical conditions can 
be described by more than one diagnostic code. All of the 
codes may be technically correct but could lead to different
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DRG assignments-thus different reimbursement (Office of 
Technology, 1986).
As DRG reimbursement levels have been reduced, the 
accuracy of coding and DRG assignment has become a higher 
priority in hospitals. The manual assignment, by medical 
record professionals, of codes and the proper sequencing of 
codes to ensure an accurate DRG, is no longer adequate.
More hospitals are purchasing computerized encoders and 
groupers to aid the process.
Although only one research study has been published to 
indicate that a computerized system increases reimbursement 
over the manual system, hospital management, peer review 
organizations and third party payers have long felt that the 
computer does optimize reimbursement. Many articles have 
been published concerning the phenomena of 'DRG Creep’-the 
concept that providers are maximizing diagnoses (ie: shift a 
patient from 1 diagnosis to a higher paying other 
diagnosis) to obtain a higher rate for their patients.
"DRG Creep may be defined as a deliberate and 
systematic shift in a hospital’s reported case mix in order 
to improve reimbursement" (Spiegel, 1986). In order to 
understand the importance of DRG Creep, it is necessary to 
understand the concept of case mix.
Case mix management is one of the most important 
challenges hospitals face. Case mix is the hospital’s mix 
of products or DRGs. Hospital product lines are patient
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groupings. Case mix can be defined as the “distribution of 
a hospital’s patients among different diagnostic, age, and 
operative groups" (Spiegel, 1986).
Case mix is an index of the "relative costliness of 
the inpatient cases treated in a particular hospital 
compared to those treated in the 'average’ or 'typical’ 
hospital" (Spiegel,1986). The case mix index for all 
hospitals is 1.0; hospitals with case mixes above 1.0 spend 
more to treat their patients while hospitals with case mix 
below 1.0 spend less (Spiegel,1986). For example, the case 
mix for St. Joseph Mercy Hospital, Ann Arbor, for fiscal 
year 1993. was 1.65; which makes sense, in that this 
facility sees patients with major cardiac, orthopedic and 
oncology conditions which require more resources to treat.
The government reacted to DRG Creep in 1984 when the 
national case mix for hospitals showed an increase of 5.8 
percent. This was an increase of 2.4 percent above the 
expected rate and HCFA(Health Care Financing Administration) 
felt it was due to manipulation of DRGs. The American 
Hospital Association claimed it was due to better coding and 
identification of principal diagnoses by the hospitals 
(Spiegel, 1986). So Congress created the peer review 
organizations(PROs) to, among other things, verify the 
accuracy of hospital coding for billing (Hsia, 1992).
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Summary of the Literature Review 
Table 1 provides the results of the literature review 
in tabular form and indicates when the author supported the 
theory that increased reimbursement, or case mix, was due to 
hospitals’ application of coding and sequencing 
capabilities. Only one study was found that actually 
documented the results of any research on computer 
optimization. However, literature was found supporting the 
fact that hospital case mix values have increased, and that 
the increase may be due to hospital application of coding 
rules and sequencing (Bennett, 1984).
Table 1
Studies of Optimization and DRG Manipulation
Type of Support
Author Coding Sequencing
Office of Technology, 1986 X X
Bennett, 1984 X
Spiegel, 1986 X X





Sounding Board, 1981 X
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THEORY/HYPOTHESIS
In the absence of an existing theory, I propose the 
Theory of Optimization: The theory is that the use of
computerized encoders and groupers allow medical record 
professionals to increase the payment per discharge for 
Medicare inpatients by applying coding rules more 
consistently and by allowing resequencing of codes to higher 
weighted DRGs. This optimization of coding and 
sequencing results in an increase in cost for the Medicare 
program to cover inpatient services.
The literature review supports the theory that the 
increased cost of Medicare is due to the optimisation by 
hospitals using better coding and sequencing. If this 
theory is true, then it should be possible to show an 
increase in case mix and, therefore, an increase in payment 
following implementation of coding and sequencing software.
The cost of Medicare inpatient health care (dependent 
variable) has increased since the implementation of DRGs due 
to the increase in hospitals’ case mix (dependent variable) 
which is caused by the implementation of computerized 
encoders and groupers (dependent variables). The 
computerized optimizer identifies for the coder possible 
complications and comorbidities that frequently accompany a 
specific diagnosis. In addition, the software alerts the 
coder to diagnoses which are not acceptable as principal 
diagnoses and flags diagnoses which could change the DRG
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assignment and, therefore, the weight or payment for the 
case.
Therefore, my hypothesis is as follows:
H: The use of a computerized optimizer will
increase case mix and, therefore, increase 
reimbursement.
Other variables which could impact the coding, 
sequencing and payment are:
1. coder experience;
2. physician documentation;
3. physician experience with DRGs;
4. on-going education of coders and physicians
5. changes in patient volumes within DRGs;
6. revisions to ICD-9-CM codes;
7. revisions in DRG weights;
8. revisions in DRGs.
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DESIGN/METHODOLOGY
To examine the impact of the computerised optimisation 
a retrospective study was conducted. This study 
investigated the impact of the use of a computer optimizer 
on Medicare reimbursement in a 750 bed acute care facility 
A comparison of data before and after implementation of the 
optimizer was conducted to see if there was a significant 
increase in either case mix or payment.
The methodology consisted of analyzing data from 1989 
(the year prior to computer implementation) by processing 
the data through the 1989 grouper (version 6) and also 
through the 1991 (the year following implementation of the 
computer) grouper (version 8). The 1991 data were also 
analysed by processing through both versions 6 and 8 of 
the Medicare grouper. The data were also adjusted for 
coding and DRG changes in the two grouper versions.
The case mix index between the two years was compared 
before and after computerized grouping to determine the 
affect on the shift in DRG weights. Changes in volume in 
individual DRGs were also investigated to see if the volume 
change was responsible for an increase in CMI.
The analytical method used to test the outcome was a 
t test.
Based on my experience, I expected to see an increase 
in CMI with the use of a computer optimizer program. I 
anticipated the following outcome:
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1. since 1989 data were not computer optimized, 
the case mix for 1989 data using the
1991 grouper would be less than the 1991 
CMI using the 1989 grouper;
2. since the 1991 data were optimized, the case 
mix for 1991 data using the 1989 grouper 
would be greater than the 1989 CMI using 
the 1989 grouper;
3. since 1991 data were optimized, the case mix 




The 1989 data were run through the 1991 grouper and the 
1991 data were processed through the 1989 grouper. The 
results (Table 2) were as follows:
1. as predicted, the CMI for the 1989 data using 
the 1991 grouper(8), was markedly less than the 
1991 CMI using the 1989 grouper(6) 1.3991 
compared to 1.4163.
2. contrary to what was predicted, the CMI for 
the 1991 data, using the 1989 grouper(6), was 
not greater than the 1989 data using the 1989 
grouper(6) --1.4163 compared to 1.5231.
TABLE 2
CMI/Number of Records by Fiscal Year and by Grouper
CMI/#Records







Figure 1 displays the CMI, by month, for the two 
fiscal years using the actual grouper in effect for that 
fiscal year. Both years tend to be parallel and follow 
seasonal ups and downs and the 1991 data are, on average, 
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Figure 2 and Table 3 present the CMI by month, for FY 
89 and FY 91 as calculated using both grouper 6 and 8 
(ungroupable patients were removed). Note that the CMI 
values continue the seasonal trends apparent in Figure 1 
(eg. lower values in December and January). Note also that 
the 1991 grouper (8) "bumps up" the CMI values to the extent 
that the average values for the fourth fiscal quarter of 
FY91 are 7.15 % higher than they would have been using 
Grouper 6 (1989).
An analysis was completed to determine if the 
percentage difference in actual CMI means between the two 
years was significant. Table 4 shows the difference was not 
significant in spite of the visual appearance, in Figure 2, 
of the 1991 line above (or higher) than the 1989 line.
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TABLE 3
CMI/Discharge Month by Fiscal Year by Grouper Version
Grouper/CMI




1989 Jul 1.5396 1.5096 -1.95
Aug 1.5896 1.5382 -3.23
Sep 1.5409 1.4742 -4. 33 -3. 17
Oct 1.5301 1.4680 -4.06
Nov 1.5516 1.5037 -3.09
Dec 1.5173 1.4711 -3.04 -3.40
Jan 1.4507 1.4227 -1.93
Feb 1.4661 1.3875 -5.36
Mar 1.5478 1.5623 0. 94 -2. 12
Apr 1.4591 1.4270 -2. 20
May 1.4438 1.4310 -1.25
Jun 1.5002 1.4965 -0.25 -1. 23
1991 Jul 1.4807 1.5268 3.11
Aug 1.5971 1.6543 3. 58
Sep 1.5413 1.6239 5. 36 4.02
Oct 1.5898 1.6556 4. 14
Nov 1.6004 1.6625 3. 88
Dec 1.4760 1.5800 7.05 5.02
Jan 1.4914 1.5523 4.08
Feb 1.5542 1.6597 6. 79
Mar 1.4929 1.6213 8. 60 6.49
Apr 1.4708 1.5644 6. 36
May 1.4719 1.5962 8.44
Jun 1.5639 1.6679 6. 65 7.15
Mean 1.5197 1.5440 1.60
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TABLE 4













variance equality F=1.02 
equal variance t=-0.48 P=0.635
In an attempt to identify other factors which may 
have impacted the CMI, an analysis of the differences by 
quarter was completed. This information is displayed in 
Table 5. The differences between quarters were not 
considered to be significant at a p=0.343. There also was 
no significant interactive effect of the year and quarter.
TABLE 5








Combined impact/ year and quarter interaction p=0.238
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To investigate the differences between the grouper 
populations, t-tests were performed on the data using Midas 
and Kwikstat software. The first test was conducted on the 
difference between the weights for each DRG in each grouper 
version (Table 2). Although the CMIs for each version did 
not change as expected, the grouper procedure produced 
significantly different CMIs for each year (Table 6).
In order to determine the impact of any code or DRG 
changes between the two groupers, t-tests were 
conducted on the populations removing the patients that 
were not groupable due to new or deleted codes or new 
DRGs. These tests also resulted in a significance of <.05. 
Table 7 presents the findings of these tests. It should 
be noted that by excluding the ungroupable patients, the 
populations decreased by 395 for FY89 and 632 for FY91.
Table 6
Two-Sample T-Test for Difference in Fiscal Year Weights




6 mean 1.5231 1.4163 5.4856 (p=<.001)









6 mean 1.5105 1.5269 .19194 (p=.8478)
(n) (7749) (8094)
8 mean 1.4742 1.6519 7.6410 (p=<.001)
(n) (7354) (8726)
Table 8 displays the difference in the DRG base payment 
before and after the implementation of the computer 
optimizer. The base payment is the average medicare payment 
per case for a hospital. The base payment is determined by 
the average case mix of the hospital. Therefore, as the 
case mix increases so does the payment. As was previously 
discussed and displayed in Table 6, the CMI significantly 
increased with the use of the computerized grouper or 
optimizer. This change in CMI had a direct impact on the 
average payment as shown in Table 8. The average payment 
increased from $6108 per case to $7180 per case following 
implementation of the computer. This was an 18% increase in 
payment per case which was significant at a p-<.05.
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Table 8
Two-Sample T- Test for Change in DRG Base Payment
Statistic
Variable FY89 FY91 t-value
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DISCUSSION
Based on the statistical analyses, the finding that 
computerised optimization results in increased case mix, 
increased reimbursement from grouper adjustments cannot be 
discounted.
While there are still some limitations with the 
analyses, such as the unknown changes in codes within the 
DRGs, the elimination or exclusion of complications or 
cormorbidity codes within a DRG or the actual elimination or 
addition of DRGs, the areas of significance cannot be 
ignored. The following were significant: the 
differences in fiscal year weights, and the difference in 
base payment. Also, attempts to identify variances and 
their significance to the change did not provide any 
concrete reasons for the change in CMI and payment.
Variables such as month to month changes, quarterly changes 
and, therefore, seasonal changes were not significant.
Computerized Optimization 26 
CONCLUSION
Based on the results of this research, there is 
evidence to indicate that the use of a computer optimizer 
does have an impact on increased case mix and increased 
reimbursement.
The impact of this study is two fold: from a provider’s 
point-of-view, the use of increased case mix or 
reimbursement as a cost justification for a computer 
optimizer may be valid. However, from the federal 
government’s point-of-view, discretionary coding or 
sequencing may be a significant factor in the increases in 
health care costs reported in the literature.
The purpose of the PPS system was to hold down the rise 
of Medicare expenditures (Pozgar, 1987). In 1984, case mix 
for hospitals showed an increase of 5.8 percent. This was 
2.4 percent above the expected increase and HCFA felt that 
it was due to manipulation of DRGs by the hospitals 
(Spiegel, 132). This was before computer optimizers were 
commonly available. If all Medicare certified hospitals 
purchased these computer programs and experienced a similar 
rise in CMI(15%) as the sample hospital, there would 
probably be a comparable rise in payment per case and 
therefore, an overall and perhaps dramatic increase in 
Medicare expenditures. These changes in case mix and 
payment would occur without any actual change in the patient 
mix,the care provided or the resources used to provide care.
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